If there were only 2 thiefs, thief 1 being the most senior, he would just vote for himself so he's obviously going to keep all the money for himself.

Now if there are 3 thiefs:
thief1 already knows what happens when there are 2 thiefs (thief 1 takes all the money himself and gives nothing to thief 2). So thief 1 proposes that he will take 99 gold coins and give 1 coin to thief 3. So, thief 3 says, well, 1 is better than none, and since i know if i don't vote for thief 1, I get nothing, I should vote for this plan.

If u work out on this futher considering the case for 4 thiefs and then finally for 5 thiefs u will reach d solution told earlier!!

Can u plz give me the logic of the solution..
m not able to get it..

The answer may be we all will take 25 coins each from level 1 to level 4 but the level 5 will not get anything.Hence the polling result will also be maximum 75%(3 out of 4 will favor this), why?

because if 2nd level thief think that he can gain more than he can't, because after killing one, still there will 4 to divide 100, again option of 25 each.same for 3rd and 4th.5th will be the only loser and vote against, but who care?

__________________
Brijesh Jain
brijesh.tester@yahoo.co.in
http://softwaretestingexpertise.blogspot.com

i dont think anyone wud uphold the proposal.unless u r allowed to give 2 proposal.

PPROPOSAL 1 PROPOSAL 2
thief1(me)=98 theif1(me)=98
thief 2=1 thief2=0
thief 3 =0 thief3=1
thief 4=1 thief4=0
thief 5 =0 thief5=1






2nd and 4th thief wud fear that if the first proposal is not accepted,3rd and 5th may accept the second proposal,and in that case they wud get nothing.the same will be the thought of 3rd and 5th that if they dont accept the second proposal 2nd and 4th may go with the 1st proposal and they wud get nothing.so there will be competition among (2nd and 4th) to accept the first proposal and (3rd and 5th) to accept the 2nd proposal and reject 1st proposal.
in either case i'll get more than 50% vote and max reward as well.sometimes other thieves may fight with each other and kill each other, so that i can take away everything.....

howzzzaaattt!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

My solution is:

Pirate 5 (Me): 25
Pirate 4 : 25
Pirate 3 : 25
Pirate 2 : 13
Pirate 1 : 12

Here Pirate 4 and 3 will vote for me. I have my own vote at my side. This will keep me in majority. Pirate 4 and 3 will think that if they do not accept my solution then they will murder me but 100 coins will be then distributed among them. Probably they will get 25 only which anyway they are getting. So why not accept my solution?

Pirate 1 and 2 will not accept. But they what will happen? Nothing. They constitute lesser than 50 % in the total quorum. So anyway I will get more than others and I will remain alive.

Correct me if I am wrong.

I being the senior most senior thief to distribute, I will ask level 2 to divide and obviously I will not support him and make sure level 4 and 5 are with me (They will listen to me as I am level 1). Then level 2 will be killed and I will still be level1. Now I will ask level 3 to distribute and will not support and he also will be killed and so on . . .
Finally I will be left with level 5. Now, I will take decision of me taking all 100 coins. If level 5 did not agree he will be killed. So, he will agree.